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Korean Air Lines: The Future
Interpretation of "Executive" and
"Engage" in Friendship, Commerce
and Navigation Treaties
By LAIROLD M. STREET, ESQ.*
INTRODUCTION
Foreign-owned corporations are moving into large metropolitan
communities around the United States.' For example, in recent years
approximately 130 foreign-owned companies chose the greater Washing-
ton, D.C. community as headquarters for their American operations, up
five-fold from the number based in the nation's capital area a decade
ago.2 Many of these firms come from countries having treaties similar to
the bilateral Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN) treaty be-
* Mr. Lairold M. Street is a graduate of Oberlin College, A.B.; The Johns Hopkins
University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS); and Indiana University School of
Law, (Bloomington), J.D. The author has worked with the International Trade Commission
and the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, where he is currently employed.
The author gratefully acknowledges the contribution of Becky Stein to an earlier draft of this
article. No official support or endorsement of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission or any other agency of the U.S. Government is intended or should be inferred.
1. A foreign-owned corporation operating in the United States by and large requires
American labor to run its local operation, to supervise production, and to oversee its invest-
ments here. Local labor provides a "service" in the economic equation of "goods and services"
in international business. Cf. Feketekuty, Trade in Professional Services: An Overview, 1986 U.
CHm. LEGAL F. 1.
2. These firms employ about 16,000 people in the greater Washington, D.C. area.
KPMG PEAT MARWICK, THE 1989 SURVEY OF FoREIGN-OwNED CoMPANIES WITH U.S.
HEADQUARTERS IN GREATER WASHINGTON, D.C. 13 (1990) [hereinafter 1989 SuRvEY or
FOREIGN-OWNED CoMPANIES]. Americans in the greater Washington, D.C. area are em-
ployed in many types of executive and support staff positions. For instance, in the executive
category, some hold positions as presidents or general managers, while others serve in profes-
sional and nonprofessional capacities as supervisors, clerks, or typists. Id. at 12. These
Americans work for foreign-owned firms from at least fifteen Asian and European countries.
Id at 5, 12. The top foreign-owned employers in the Washington, D.C. area come from the
United Kingdom, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Sweden,
Canada, and Japan; other firms represented in the area have their corporate homes in Israel,
Norway, Finland, Switzerland, Denmark, Belgium, and Spain. Id at 12. The United States has
bilateral FCN treaties with nearly all of these countries.
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
tween the United States and Korea.3 The growing number of foreign-
owned firms operating in the United States under FCN treaties presents a
significant trend that exposes many Americans to potentially conflicting
employment practices.4
This modem day phenomenon of a rapidly developing influx of for-
eign industry and capital may leave some Americans unprotected by U.S.
fair employment laws. Americans working in the United States for
American firms have Title VIII and other fair employment protections,
6
as do Americans employed by foreign companies from nations which are
not FCN treaty partners with the United States.7 The Americans at risk
are individuals employed by corporations governed by FCN treaty provi-
sions concerning the choice of personnel.
The United States is a party to more than 130 FCN treaties," many
of them bilateral.9 Of the bilateral treaties, nearly two dozen are similar
to the treaties under scrutiny 0 in Sumitomo ShojiAmerica, Inc. v. Avag-
liano11 and MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines.12 Those cases examined
the right of a foreign-owned company to engage executive personnel "of
3. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 28, 1956, United States-Ko-
rea, 8 U.S.T. 2217, T.I.A.S. No. 3947 [hereinafter FCN Treaty].
4. Walker, Provisions on Companies in United States Commercial Treaties, 50 AM. J.
INT'L L. 373 (1956); Street, Application of U.S. Fair Employment Laws to Transnatlonal Em-
ployers in the United States and Abroad, 19 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 357 (1987) [hereinafter
Street, Application of US. Fair Employment Laws]; Note, Commercial Treaties and the Ameri-
can Civil Rights Laws: The Case of Japanese Employers, 31 STAN. L. REv. 947, 952-53 (1079)
[hereinafter Note, Commercial Treaties].
5. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) protects individuals from employ-
ment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. Civil Rights
Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Tit. VII, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 241, 253-57 (1964) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982)).
6. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat.
602 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)) (forbidding
employers from discrimination against employees based on their age); The Equal Pay Act
(EPA), Pub. L. No. 88-38, § 3, 77 Stat. 56, 56-57 (1963) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982))
(prohibiting sex-based discrimination in the payment of wages).
7. Lewis & Ottley, Title VII and Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Treaties:
Prognostications Based Upon Sumitomo Shoji, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. (1983). See also Sumitomo
Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982); Wickes v. Olympic Airlines, 745 F.2d
363 (6th Cir. 1984).
8. Walker, supra note 4, at 374. See also Lewis & Ottley, supra note 7, at 45-46.
9. See Lewis & Ottley, supra note 7, at 45-48; see also Note, Discriminatory Hiring Prac-
tices by Foreign Corporations in the United States-A Limited Right, 5 FORDHAM INT'L LJ.
509, 513-516 (1982) [hereinafter Note, Discriminatory Hiring Practices].
10. Note, Discriminatory Hiring Practices, supra note 9, at 513-16; see also Ritomsky &
Jarvis, Doing Business in America: The Unfinished Work of Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v.
Avagliano, 27 HARV. INT'L L.J. 193, 215-19 (1986).
11. 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
12. 863 F.2d 1135 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 349 (1989).
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their choice" for certain key positions in the company. 13 This pursuit is
complicated by the lack of a uniform definition of the terms "executive"
and "engage" for the purposes of FCN treaties. Article VIH(1) of the
FCN treaty between Korea and the United States provides that:
Nationals and companies of either Party shall be permitted to engage,
within the territories of the other Party, accountants and other techni-
cal experts, executive personnel, attorneys, agents and other specialists
of their choice. Moreover, such nationals and companies shall be per-
mitted to engage accountants and other technical experts regardless of
the extent to which they may have qualified for the practice of a pro-
fession within the territories of such other Party, for the particular
purpose of making examinations, audits, and technical investigations
for, and rendering reports to, such nationals and companies in connec-
tion with the planning and operation of their enterprises, and enter-
prises in which they have a financial interest, within such territories.
14
The economic and legal ramifications of having more foreign-owned
businesses operating in the United States will become widespread as
more Americans work for such companies, especially as they become
more aware of the implications on U.S. trade policy and the importance
of international trade in services.15 For example, data on foreign direct
investment in this country show a continuing rapid upward turn in in-
vestment beginning in the 1980s with no indication of leveling off.16 In
fact, figures indicate that foreign investment transactions have grown
dramatically over the past ten years.1 7 Further, during the mid-1980s,
"over 1,700 foreign-owned firms employ[ed] more than 2.5 million
Americans in the United States,"' and continued foreign investment
presumably will further increase the number of Americans working for
foreign corporations in the United States. 9
13. For a discussion of the term "of their choice" in Article VII(l) provisions in FCN
treaties, see generally Walker, supra note 4, at 387.
14. FCN Treaty, art. VIII, para. 1, 8 U.S.T. at 2223 (emphasis added).
15. Feketekuty, supra note 1, at 16-19.
16. WoRLD TRADE ACADEMY PRESS, DIREcroRY oF FOREiGN FIRMs IN THE UNITED
STATES v (6th ed. 1989).
17. Id.; see also INT'L TRADE ADMIN., U.S. DEPr OF COMMERCE, FoREIGN DIRECT
INVESrMENT IN THE UNrrD STATES: 1987 TRANSAIONs 3 (1988).
18. Street, Application of US: Fair Employment Laws, supra note 4, at 358 fn. 7 (quoting
BuREAu OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SERIES FOF, No. 6, SELECTED CHAR-
ACTERISTICS OF FOREIGN-OWNED U.S. FIRMS: 1982 1-2 (1984)).
19. See Working for Japan, Ina, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 2, 1987, at 42; Anderson, Is America
for Sale?, PARADE MAG., Apr. 16, 1989, at 6, col. 1; Hicks, The Takeover ofAmerican Indus-
try, N.Y. Times, May 28, 1989, § 3 (Business), at 1, col. 2. See also Hernessy, Restructuring
Capitalism: The World Catches Takeover Fever, N.Y. Times, May 21, 1989, § 3 (Business), at
3, col. 1.
1990]
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As more Americans work for foreign transnational companies, U.S.
courts and foreign policymakers will be called upon to sort out the legal
rights of the treaty partners, companies, and workers. The central con-
cern will focus on the relationship of U.S. employment laws to FCN trea-
ties. As more foreign-owned firms relocate from nations with which the
United States has entered into FCN treaties, and these companies assert
their article VIII(l) privileges, there may be a reduction in "the access to
executive positions for American applicants in view of the considerable
growth of foreign investment in the United States."2 However, the im-
pact of article VIII(l) type provisions of FCN treaties on the employ-
ment of Americans for certain jobs is not yet apparent.21
This Article uses the Korean Air Lines case to examine the meaning
of the terms "engage" and "executive," a problem raised by a growing
number of cases involving FCN treaties in employment litigation. The
Article is divided into five parts. Part I reviews the purpose and legal
status of FCN treaties in light of Sumitomo and Korean Air Lines. Part
II considers the interpretations of engage and executive taken from U.S.
statutes and from international standards, both of which represent a
principal contribution to the understanding of the meaning of these
terms. Parts III and IV are devoted to the application and detailed cri-
tique of the terms as defined by these statutes and standards. Part V
summarizes the Article's findings.
I. COMPANIES OPERATING UNDER FRIENDSHIP,
COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION TREATIES
A. Purpose and Legal Status of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation Treaties
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation treaties are bilateral com-
mercial agreements that give legal status to companies of the signatory
countries, allowing them to conduct business in the host country on es-
20. Note, Judicial Decisions, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 664, 673 (1981).
21. 1989 SURVEY OF FOREIGN-OWNED COMPANIES, supra note 2, at 13. Of the largest
foreign-owned firms in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area, the Canadians are the largest
employers of Americans with 7,745 employees. Id. The study on employment of foreign-
owned companies also notes that:
An examination of foreign national employment in greater-Washington shows that
headquarters from some nations rely on U.S. citizens to a greater degree than do
others. For example, of the 1,099 positions created by the French headquarters, 169
(15 percent) are filled by French citizens. By contrast, of 4,816 positions created by
UK headquarters, 273 (6 percent) are filled by UK citizens.
Id. That report also indicates that in many cases American citizens act as "president, chief
financial officer, or general manager" for foreign firms operating in the area. Id.
[Vol, 14
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sentially the same footing as domestic companies. 2 The United States
entered into its first commercial treaty in 1778.3 The early commercial
treaties were primarily concerned with the trade and shipping rights of
individuals.2 4 As business concerns in the twentieth century turned to-
ward corporate involvement in international trade, the United States be-
gan to enter into treaties that granted companies the right to function
abroad.' However, these treaties granted only legal status and access to
foreign courts, and it was not until after World War H that the United
States began to negotiate FCN treaties which allowed the parties to con-
duct business in the other signatory country on a comparable basis with
domestic firms.26 Specifically, FCN treaties allow companies in the sig-
natory countries to establish joint and reciprocal trading principles, and
provide for each nation's citizens' property rights and other interests
within the territory of the host nation.2v These include the right to en-
gage in business,28 the right to purchase and hold property,29 free access
to the courts, 0 and judicial recognition of persons and companies by the
laws of the host territory.3
A signatory to a FCN treaty may be accorded three possible stan-
dards of treatment: national treatment, most-favored-nation treatment,
22. Walker, Modern Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 42 MNN. L REV.
805, 806 (1958) [hereinafter Walker, Modern Treaties]. The author, Herman Walker, was a
chief negotiator of the FCN treaties. See also Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano. 457
U.S. 176, 181 n.6 (1982). Walker has stated:
[The treaties] are above-all... concerned with the protection of persons, natural and
judicial, and of the property and interests of other persons. They define the treat-
ment each country owes the nationals of the other;, their rights to engage in business
and other activities within the boundaries of the former, and the respect due them,
their property and their enterprises.
Walker, Modern Treaties, supra, at 806.
The United States is currently a party to 40 such treaties, all enacted after World War II
and all having the same or similar language. For a list of the countries with which the United
States is a party to an FCN treaty, see 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101 (1988).
23. Walker, Modern Treaties, supra note 22, at 805.
24. Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 186.
25. IKL
26. Id at 186-87. Herman Walker notes that an impetus for foreign companies to seek
more rights in the United States than they had previously enjoyed was this country's emer-
gence after World War H as "a principal reservoir of investment capital in a world which ha[d]
become acutely 'economic development' conscious." Walker, The Post-far Commercial
Treaty Program of the United States, 73 PoL Sci. Q. 57, 59 (1957).
27. Walker, Modern Treaties, supra note 22, at 805.06.
28. See, eg., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, United
States-Japan, art. VIII, para. 1, 4 U.S.T. 2063, 2070, T.LA.S. No. 2863.
29. See, eg., id art. VI, 4 U.S.T. at 2068.
30. See, eg., id, art. IV, 4 U.S.T. at 2067.
31. See, eg., id art. XXII, para. 3, 4 U.S.T. at 2079.
1990
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
and absolute treatment. National treatment allows foreign corporations
to have the same rights and subjects them to the same responsibilities as
domestic companies. 2 Most-favored-nation treatment is merely the
same treatment accorded to the company of any third country.33 Abso-
lute treatment allows foreign corporations certain rights irrespective of
whether the host country's national corporations receive them.34
B. National Treatment and the Scope of Article VIII(1)
The U.S. Supreme Court's first significant scrutiny of FCN treaty
standards of national treatment was in Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. V.
Avagliano.35 In that case, the Court concluded that a foreign-owned firm
incorporated in New York was entitled to national treatment while oper-
ating in the United States.36 The Court considered whether the provi-
sions of the Japan-U.S. FCN treaty excused a subsidiary of a Japanese
company incorporated in the United States from the provisions of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.37 The Court held that the American
incorporated subsidiary was a U.S. company and not Japanese, and thus
article VIII(l), which gives a Japanese company the right to select a Jap-
anese citizen or a person "of their choice" for an executive position, was
inapplicable.38
The Sumitomo decision raised important questions concerning the
treatment of FCN treaties in American courts, but did not address sev-
eral key issues concerning the relationship between FCN's and U.S. fair
employment laws. 39  The Supreme Court decision left open and un-
32. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 188 n.18 (1982).
33. Id.
34. Walker, Modern Treaties, supra note 22, at 811-12. Absolute treatment is also referred
to as noncontingent treatment since, under this standard, rights acorded the foreign corpora-
tion are not contingent on the treatment accorded to corporations of other countries. Id. There
is disagreement over whether FCN treaties provide for national or absolute treatment. How-
ever, this dispute goes more toward the question of whether FCN treaties prevail over United
States discrimination laws, ie., whether foreign companies have more privileges than Ameri-
can companies. Since this issue is not the focus of this article, there will be no discussion
regarding which standard of treatment applies to signatories of FCN treaties.
35. 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
36. Id. at 457-58.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Street, Application of U.S. Fair Employment Laws, supra note 4, at 375-78; Ritomsky
& Jarvis, supra note 10, at 215-19. For a discussion of the consent decree in the aftermath of
Sumitomo and issues it raises concerning the need for better job analysis of the skills actually
required for certain jobs, see Reich, After Avagliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc.: What
Standard of Title VII Will Apply to Foreign-Owned U.S. Subsidiaries and Branches?, 10 B.C.
THIRD WORLD L.J. 259, 281-88 (1990).
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resolved questions concerning how U.S. courts should interpret a foreign
company or branch office's article VIII(l) right to engage executives of
their choice while operating in the United States. 4° In contrast to the
Sumitomo decision, Korean Air Lines4 provides an opportunity for in-
sights into how courts might interpret these particular provisions of FCN
treaties. The treaty at issue in Korean Air Lines contains an employment
privilege similar to the article VIII(l) provision of the treaty at issue in
Sumitomo.42
In Korean Air Lines, it was undisputed that the foreign-owned firm
was entitled to invoke article VflI(l) of the U.S.-Korea FCN treaty.43
Because Korean Air Lines (KAL) operates in the United States as an
American branch of a foreign corporation rather than as a domestically
incorporated subsidiary of a foreign corporation, the Korean Air Lines
decision takes on additional significance for courts wrestling with the in-
teraction between the language of article VIII(l) type provisions and
U.S. antidiscrimination laws.'
At the heart of the interaction between FCN treaties and U.S. fair
employment laws lies the quandry whether either party to a treaty can
hire whomever it wishes to manage and operate the corporation. It is
crucial that U.S. courts craft a clear road map for other courts to follow,
and pave the way to an appropriate standard for interpreting the mean-
ing of a treaty involved in litigation. Otherwise, enforcement of these
treaties will result in many corporations hiring their citizens to the exclu-
sion of nationals of the host country. This is because:
A FCN treaty permits a foreign company to fill all of its top manage-
ment positions or any one management level with "treaty-trader" su-
pervisors, executives, and other specialists. Unfettered use of treaty
traders may result in discrimination against Americans on the basis of
40. Street, Application of U.& Fair Employment Laws, supra note 4, at 387-88.
41. MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d 1135 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 349 (1989). For a brief discussion of some of the issues in the MacNamara case, see gener-
ally Street, International Commercial and Labor Migration Requirements as a Bar to Discrimi-
natory Employment Practices, 31 How. L.i 497, 504-05 (1988); Note, Treaties offriendship,
commerce and navigation-subsequently enacted legislation-Civil Rights Act of 1964-Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 84 AM. J. INT'L LAw 565 (1990).
42. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d at 1139.
43. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 1, Korean Air Lines (Nos. 88-1449 &
88-1551) [hereinafter Brief for the U.S.]; see also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at 5, Korean AirLines (No. 88-1449) [hereinafter
KAL's Petition]; Cross-Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit at 1, 6, Korean AirLines (No. 88-1551) [hereinafter MacNamara's Cross-
Petition].
44. The U.S. Supreme Court denied the petitioners a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Korean Air Lines, 110 S. Ct. at 349.
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national origin by substantially reducing the number of jobs with for-
eign companies available to U.S. citizens. Determining who shall qual-
ify for a treaty-trader visa may effectively determine the extent to
which foreign companies are allowed to fill management and specialist
positions with their own nationals.
45
Article VIII(l) has come back to haunt the United States, which in
the past pushed through treaties with a number of nations that often
resisted U.S. initiatives to obtain national treatment for U.S. business
abroad." The United States originally ruled the roost in foreign trade;
later, other nations became formidable trade competitors. These nations
now invoke FCN treaties to employ their own citizens in running their
corporations operating in the United States. Ultimately, this foments
hard feelings as otherwise qualified American workers of these foreign-
owned corporations find themselves excluded or eliminated from high
level jobs solely because they are American.47 The, U.S. Government can
do more to clarify the meaning of FCN treaties, thereby reducing any
potentially negative impact on American executive personnel. For in-
stance, the State Department, which conducts U.S. foreign policy and
relations, should be more assertive and less evasive when asked for gui-
dance on whether a particular treaty permits a foreign subsidiary to fill
executive personnel positions. Rather, it has merely stated that "[w]e
express no opinion on what position would, in a particular case, qualify
as executive personnel.
' '4
C. Article VIII(1) Issues Raised by the Korean Air Lines Case
The FCN treaty between the United States and Korea was involved
in Korean Air Lines.4 9 Article VIII(l) of the treaty gives the signatories
the right to "engage, within the territories of the other Party... execu-
45. Street, Application of U.S. Fair Employment Laws, supra note 4, at 389.
46. Compare Walker, Treaties for the Encouragement and Protection of Foreign Invest-
ment: Present United States Practice, 5 AM. J. COMP. L. 229 (1956) (favoring such treaties as
providing foundation for American investment abroad) with Leigh, Judicial Decisions - Avig-
liano v. Sumitomo Shoji American, Inc., 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 671 (1981) (supporting interpreta.
tion of FCN treaties so as to not give foreign companies special exceptions to avoid American
employment laws).
47. See Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
48. Letter from the State Department Deputy Legal Advisor, Lee R. Marks, to then Gen-
eral Counsel of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Abner W. Sibal (Oct. 17,
1978), reprinted in part in Nash, Contemporary Practice of the U.S. Relating to International
Law, 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 282 (1979).




tire personnel... of their choice."5 This provision was included "'to
prevent the imposition of ultranationalistic policies with respect to essen-
tial executive and technical personnel.' "51 The purpose of the treaty,
however, is to allow foreign companies to manage and control their in-
vestments abroad.
52
1. MacNamara's Plight and Korean Air Lines
The plaintiff, MacNamara, a fifty-seven year-old white male, was
fired from his job as a district sales manager by defendant, KAL, and
replaced by a forty-two year-old Korean male.53 Plaintiff brought suit
under both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,"' alleging discrimi-
nation on the basis of national origin,55 and under the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act (ADEA),56 alleging age discrimination." KAL
claimed in defense that article VIII(l) of the U.S.-Korea FCN treaty
gave the company the right to terminate executives as it chose without
regard to U.S. antidiscrimination law.58 Defendant contended that both
MacNamara and his replacement were executives within the meaning of
the treaty, and that the word "engage," as used in the treaty, protected
50. FCN Treaty, art. VIII, para. 1, 8 U.S.T. at 2223 (emphasis added). For the full text of
article VI1(1), see supra text accompanying note 14. All FCN treaties contain this provision
or one that is similar.
51. Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 181 n.6 (quoting Walker, Provisions on Companies in United
States Commercial Treaties 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 373, 386 (1956)). The United States faced
various obstacles to conducting business in foreign countries, one of which was foreign laws
requiring American companies abroad to hire a certain percentage of their employees from
among citizens of the host country. Note, Commercial Treaties, supra note 4, at 948. These
restrictive foreign laws are often referred to as percentile restrictions. This provision, therefore,
was included in the FCN treaties on the insistence of the United States. Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at
181 n.6.
52. Article VIII(l) allows nationals and companies of either party "to control and man-
age enterprises which they have established or acquired." FCN Treaty, art. VIII, pa. 1, 8
U.S.T. at 2223.
Both plaintiff and defendant agreed that the proper way to analyze whether an individual
is an executive within the meaning of the treaty is to inquire whether he is in a position of
management and control of the enterprise. See Appellant's Brief at 35, Korean Air Lines (No.
87-1741); Appellee's Brief at 43, Korean Air Lines (No. 87-1741).
53. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d at 1137-38. At the time that KAL discharged
MacNamara, it also terminated five of its other American managers, replacing all of them with
four Korean managers. Id at 1138.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).
55. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d at 1138.
56. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988).
57. KoreanAir Lines, 863 F.2d at 1138. In addition to alleging discrimination on the basis
of race, national origin, and age, plaintiff also claimed that his termination caused a depriva-
tion of benefits due under the company's pension plan in violation of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
58. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d at 1138.
1990]
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termination decisions.5 9 MacNamara claimed that he was not an execu-
tive within the meaning of article VIII(I) because he lacked the authority
and responsibilities vested in such a management position.'
The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted
a motion for summary judgment in favor of the defendant KAL.61 The
court held that MacNamara was an executive within the meaning of the
FCN treaty and, therefore, the defendant's actions were protected by the
treaty.62 The court found that the treaty's phrase "of their choice" gave
Korean companies a right to hire and fire executives as they chose with-
out regard to American discrimination laws, thus affording plaintiff no
cause of action for discrimination.6 3 The district court also construed the
59. MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, No. 87-1741, slip op. at 2 (3d Cir. Nov. 6, 1987).
60. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d at 1141. KAL claimed that it "is essential [for the
Supreme Court] to clarify the rights of investors in both countries to manage and control their
overseas branch operations with key executives in whom they have the most confidence."
KAL's Petition, supra note 43, at 9 (emphasis added). MacNamara claimed that he was an
administrator without executive responsibilities because his "duties as District Sales Manager
were purely administrative[ ]" and that he was required to get approval of KAL's offices In
New York, Los Angeles, or Seoul, Korea before implementing decisions of his own,
MacNamara's Cross-Petition, supra note 43, at 12. MacNamara also maintained that the
Court of Appeals incorrectly "accepted that this job was entitled status as well as his replace-
ment['s job]." Id. The petitioners concede that the FCN treaty allows for the filing of "key
positions abroad" as the treaty parties intended. Brief for the U.S., supra note 43, at 6 (empha-
sis added). "The clear implication is that companies normally must hire only those profession-
als who do have the qualifications required" to perform the job. Brief for the U.S., supra note
43, at 8. See also KAL's Petition, supra note 43, at 9; MacNamara's Cross-Petition, supra note
43, at 8.
61. MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 45 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 384, 391 (E.D. Pa.
1987). Although defendant brought a motion to dismiss, the district court decided the motion
as one for summary judgment since it considered matters outside the pleadings. MacNamara v.
Korean Air Lines, No. 87-1741, slip op. at 1 n.1 (3d Cir. Nov. 6, 1987).
62. Korean Air Lines, 45 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 388.
63. Id. at 390. This article will not discuss the issue of whether Article VIII(I) of the
Korean FCN treaty and similar "of their choice" provisions in other FCN treaties give foreign
companies protection from U.S. civil rights laws. For a discussion of this issue, see, e.g., Street,
Application of U.S. Fair Employment Laws, supra note 4 (assessing the impact of the Age
Discrimination Act of 1967, the Equal Pay Act of 1963, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 on employer-employee relations of foreign companies); Ritomsky & Jarvis, supra note
10, at 195 (arguing "that the drafters of the FCN treaties did not intend to create an exemption
from discrimination laws for foreign businesses"); Note, The Rights of a Foreign Corporation
and its Subsidiary Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Treaties of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation, 17 GEo. WASH. J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 607 (1983) (arguing that the
drafters' intent and the history and purpose of the FCN treaties indicate that they are not to
supersede American discrimination laws); Note, Japanese Employers and Title VII: Sumitomo
a Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 15 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & Poi.. 653 (1983) (discussing the




term "engage" to necessarily include the right to terminate."
On appeal, the Third Circuit took a different approach to defining
engage and executive. Its inquiry was whether the right to engage in-
cluded the right to replace an employee, as MacNamara had been, with a
Korean national.65 It answered that question in the affirmative.61 Also,
reasoning that the question of whether MacNamara's position was execu-
tive was irrelevant, thus leaving the district court's finding of executive
status untested, the court found that the proper inquiry was whether
MacNamara's replacement, Mr. Chung, was an executive.67 The court
held that Chung was an executive within the meaning of the treaty since
he entered the United States pursuant to an E-1 treaty trader visa and
since, as a result of the company's reorganization, Mr. Chung's sales ter-
ritory was larger than MacNamara's had been.69
2. The United States Supreme Court Denies Certiorari Review
The U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear KAL's petition for certio-
rari to clarify MacNamara's executive status under article VIII(l). 70 On
writ of certiorari, KAL again asserted that article VIH(l) gives the Ko-
rean U.S. branch office operating here an absolute right to engage Ko-
rean executives of their choice;71 that a conflict between the circuits
64. Korean AirLines, 45 Fair Empl. Prae. Cas. (BNA) at 384-85.
65. MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d 1135, 1141 (3d Cir. 1988), cert dented,
110 S. Ct. 349 (1989).
66. Id at 1140.
67. Id
68. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(E) (1988). For a definition of treaty trader status, see infra
notes 97-114 and accompanying text.
69. MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, No. 87-1741, slip op. at 10-11 (3d Cir. Nov. 6,
1987). Even though the court of appeals did not think it necessary to define the terms "execu-
tive" and "engage", this article will explore their definitions for two reasons. First, it is only
because MacNamara happened to be replaced by a Korean national with treaty trader status
that the court of appeals changed its inquiry. Had these circumstances not been present in the
case, the court would have had to define these terms. This article, therefore, may be helpful in
defining these terms for future cases. Second, the focus of this case is on whether MacNamara
was improperly discharged in violation of American discrimination laws, and whether KAL
properly carried out this discharge in light of the treaty. Thus, the proper inquiry is whether
MacNamara was an executive. KAL argued in its brief for certiorari that the Third Circuit
correctly defined the terms "executive" and "engage." KAL's Petition, supra note 43, at 8.
70. MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 110 S. Ct 349 (1989).
71. KAL argued in its petition for certiorari that the Third Circuit correctly held that the
meaning of the term "engage" for "foreign nationals necessarily includes the right to replace
people in MaeNamara's position with a foreign national." KAL's Petition, supra note 43, at 8.
MacNamara, on the other hand, reasserted that the dictionary definition of engage did not give
KAL "the right to fire [MacNamara] with impunity once it had made such a selection."
MacNamara's Cross-Petition, supra note 43, at 11. The U.S. Government adopted the view
that the right to engage executives "of their choice" encompasses the right to discharge them
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exists on this point; and that it is unclear how this provision of the FCN
treaty should be applied.72 KAL also reasserted its claim that it and
other foreign companies would suffer an unnecessary economic burden if
required to defend such personnel actions in U.S. courts.
7 3
MacNamara cross-petitioned for certiorari contending that the
court of appeals incorrectly rejected some of his claims and imposed un-
necessary restrictions on the nature and scope of these claims.74 He fur-
ther contended that the court failed to allow him a right of full discovery
at the trial level.75 The Third Circuit had permitted MacNamara's dis-
parate treatment claim to proceed, 76 but dismissed the disparate impact
portion of his complaint.77
too. Brief for the U.S., supra note 43, at 19. A contrary meaning of the term "engage" would
"'freeze a foreign business' initial management structure and dis.ourage any experimentation
with host country executive personnel.'" Id. at 20 (quoting Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d 1135
at 1141). The United States concluded that "'the power of removal from office is incident to
the power of appointment.'" Id. at 19 (citing Carlucci v. Doe, 485 U.S. 904 (1988)); see also
Keim v. United States, 177 U.S. 290, 293 (1900). If a foreign company's right to engage execu-
tives "of its choice" encompasses the right to not only hire but discharge executives, then
article VIII(l) should not be selectively applied to the employment of executives by foreign
companies. If left unchecked, a company in KAL's position could replace a lower level non-
executive status employee with a foreign national employee as a pretext for discrimination. See
Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Antonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989). For this reason, a court
should independently examine a foreign employer's explanation or justification of executive
status for a particular employee or replacement to determine whether the job classification of
"executive personnel" is a pretext for discrimination.
72. See KAL's Petition, supra note 43, at 7-9.
73. Id. at 8-9.
74. See MacNamara's Cross-Petition, supra note 43, at 4.
75. Id. at 11-12.
76. In disparate treatment cases to determine whether there has, in fact, been discrimina-
tion, U.S. courts have developed a three-step order and allocation of proof. First, a plaintiff
has the initial burden of proving aprimafacie case of discrimination. Once aprimafacie case
has been established, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate nondis-
criminatory reason for its challenged action. Finally, if the employer articulates a legitimate
reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the legitimate reason offered was not the true reason, but was rather a pretext for discrimi-
nation. Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc., v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989); McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979).
An evaluation of an individual disparate treatment claim allows a person like
MacNamara a chance to offer evidence which contradicts the evidence that KAL has submit-
ted to support the company's assertion that he and his replacement are executives, The right
to engage executives "of their choice" encompasses the right to discharge an American execu-
tive in order to replace him with an equally qualified foreign national for the same position.
77. MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d 1135, 1140-41 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 349 (1989). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 entitles MacNamara to bring
an employment discrimination action based upon the "adverse impact" theory of discrimina-
tion. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, (1988); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433
U.S. 321 (1977); Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Adverse impact or
disparate impact results when an employer's neutral employment policy or practice is applied
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3. Government Opposes Certiorari
In response to both petitioners, the U.S. Government entered its
evenhandedly to all employees or applicants but has the effect of disproportionately excluding
certain protected groups. If the employee can establish that the company's procedures have a
disparate impact, then the company must justify the use of the policy or practice causing the
adverse impact as a business necessity. Watson, 487 U.S. at 977; Dothard, 433 U.S. at 321;
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 424. The Third Circuit's opinion precludes use of the disparate impact
theory. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d at 1148.
In rejecting MacNamara's disparate impact theory, the court said that he "may not pro-
ceed with any claim that KAL violated Title VII by replacing its Caucasian American sales
managers with Koreans without regard to its subjective intent." Ide The court rejected
MacNamara's disparate impact claim because a potential conflict existed regarding the lan-
guage of the FCN treaty and the extent to which U.S. fair employment laws proscribe person-
nel decisions based on citizenship solely because of their disparate impact on the basis of age,
race, or national origin. Ita In so holding, the Court concluded that if disparate impact cases
were allowed to proceed, "a foreign business from a country with a homogenous population
... could be held in violation of Title VII" by merely exercising their article VIII) FCN
treaty rights. Id The Third Circuit opinion can be understood to mean that any disparate
impact theory of liability would have the effect of penalizing a foreign company "from a coun-
try with a homogenous population" from exercising its treaty right regardless of the effect on
Americans or other individuals working for the foreign company in the United States. Id.
According to Webster's dictionary, a nation's population is "homogenous" if it consists of
uniform elements, as of people or groups with a similar background. See WEnsTRm's THIRD
NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1976). Of the approximately two dozen FCN
treaties to which the United States is a party, virtually all of the countries fall within Webster's
definition of a nation having a "homogenous" population (e.g., the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Liberia, Ethiopia, or Japan). Each of these coun-
tries have "homogenous" populations relative to that of the United States which has sizeable
racial, immigrant, national origin, and ethnic groups.
Does the Court's outright rejection of MacNamara's disparate treatment claim preclude a
challenge to foreign business citizen preference on the grounds that it has a disparate impact
on the basis of national origin when the challenger is an Asian-American or resident alien of
Korean descent, and the employer is a Japanese company operating in the United States? For
instance, some Koreans living in Japan believe that Japanese companies are reluctant to hire
them even when they are either longterm residents or citizens of Japan. See Street, Interna-
tional Commercial and Labor Migration Requirements as a Bar to Discriminatory Employment
Practices, 31 How. L.I. 497, 503 n.14 (1988) (citing N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1986, at A13, col.
2). The Korean population is one of the largest of the Asian groups in the United States. See
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT: ASIAN
AND PACIFIC ISLANDERS POPULATION BY STATE 1980, at 1-2 (1983).
Will other courts interpret Article VIII(l) of the FCN treaty in conjunction with the
Third Circuit's opinion as absolutely barring all disparate impact claims against potentially
discriminatory employment practices? After this court decision, can Caucasian-Americans
bring a national origin, race, or age discrimination disparate treatment claim against a Swedish
or American company? What about an African-American? Is he barred from bringing such an
action because he is not white and few blacks live in Sweden? What about a Caucasian or
African-American who claims discrimination against an Ethiopian or Liberian firm? Can an
American female bring a disparate impact sex claim against any of these firms?
The Third Circuit's decision raises many questions. It appears to question whether the
disparate impact analysis is applicable only under certain circumstances. Future courts will
need to carefully scrutinize the Third Circuit's opinion that precludes a disparate impact ac-
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brief as amicus curiae in opposition to the petitions for certiorari.78 The
Government asserted that the case was not properly before the Court
because of its interlocutory posture, as the Third Circuit had remanded
the case back to the district court.79 The Government also offered its
own views on the Third Circuit's decision, claiming that "[t]he decision
of the court of appeals is correct .... ."8  By denying certiorari in this
case, the Supreme Court has chosen to remain silent, for the moment, on
the rights of foreign companies operating in the United States to hire and
fire only those key professionals who qualify as essential executive
personnel."'
II. ANALYSIS OF THE MEANING OF THE TERMS
"EXECUTIVE" AND "ENGAGE"
A. Executive Status Personnel
To assess whether MacNamara was an executive within the meaning
of the FCN treaty, it is necessary to describe his job responsibilities. He
was a district sales manager, salaried at 23,000 dollars per year.82
MacNamara performed a number of specific and general staff duties. His
duties included supervising the airline's marketing activity in Penn-
sylvania, Delaware, and the southern half of New Jersey. 83 He also re-
ported monthly on the status of KAL's operation; to the Vice President
of Marketing for North America in KAL's New York office.84 He was
responsible for four to six full-time employees.85 "He directed the assem-
bly and maintenance of all sales and productivity information. ' 86 "He
evaluated employee job performance and recommended promotions. ' 87
tion by a "Caucasian American sales manager [or other American who is replaced] ... with
Koreans" so as not to limit or restrict the employment rights of Americans or foreign nationals
who desire an opportunity to prove their case in court when a reasonable claim exists, Id.
78. Brief for the U.S., supra note 43, at 5.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 6. See also MacNamara's Cross-Petition, supra note 43, at 8; KAL's Petition,
supra note 43, at 9.




85. Id Plaintiff contends that his supervisory duties were minimal since the employees
that reported to him were low level staff: a secretary, a ticket agent, and a cargo representative.
Appellant's Brief, supra note 52, at 37.
86. Korean Air Lines, 45 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 388.
87. Id. However, MacNamara was not given final authority for hiring and firing deci-




He issued and signed checks for office expenses, was responsible for all
cargo and passenger sales within the district, prepared marketing plans
and objectives for sales staff, and implemented marketing strategy
changes without authorization from headquarters.88
B. District Court Definition of Executive Status
The term "executive" is not defined anywhere in the treaty, 9 nor
does any case law define it for treaty purposes. The district court defined
executive as "personnel who [are] directly involved in the company's
policymaking, directly involved in the administration of that policy, or
... report the economic or legal status of the enterprise directly to the
company's top management,"' 9 and "whose services are essential to the
functioning of a business enterprise."9" The court also required that the
responsibilities be "necessary to the efficient conduct of the business and
protection of the foreign investment." 92 It rejected plaintiff's contention
that an executive must be an officer or director of a company.93 The
court also applied the test from the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)
for exempt executive status. 94 Based on MacNamara's responsibilities,
the court held that he was an executive.9" The court concluded that
since MacNamara's Korean replacement, Mr. Chung, was a treaty
trader, and since KAL was consolidating many of its operations to bring
them within Mr. Chung's responsibilities, KAL had legitimately exer-
cised its right to manage its investment.96
88. Korean Air Lines, 45 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 388. But see Appellant's Brief,
supra note 52, at 37 (MacNamara's role as a supervisor is described as "minimal" pertaining
only to "low level" employees). See also Appellee's Brief, supra note 52, at 5 (MacNamara did
not do the hiring himself but rather interviewed applicants and recommended his hiring prefer-
ences to the regional office, which were approved in each case).
89. MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, No. 87-1741, slip op. at 9 (3d Cir. Nov. 6, 1987).
90. Korean Air Lines, 45 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 387. The court also included personnel
"who were engaged to provide an essential technical service" within the protection of the "of




93. Id All of these criteria were the district court's own definition; it cited no authority
for these definitions.
94. Id. at 388. For a discussion of the Fair Labor Standards Act, see infra notes 115-132
and accompanying text.
95. Korean Air Lines, 45 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 388. ("Unquestionably, plain-
tiff's job responsibilities and duties were executive in nature and essential to the administration
of policy of the company.")
96. Id
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C. Interpretive Authorities and the Meaning of Executive
1. Definition of Executive Under the Immigration and
Naturalization Act (INA)97
The INA was enacted to complement FCN treaties. 98 For this rea-
son, employees who enter the United States pursuant to this statute are
known as "treaty traders." The INA, however, offers courts very little by
way of a concrete definition of executive and does not enumerate the
types of responsibilities that would be considered executive in nature. It
merely states that treaty traders must enter the country "solely to carry
on substantial trade."99
Because the State Department is responsible for implementing the
INA's mandate,"°° and its decisions are subject to minimal judicial scru-
tiny,10 1 courts give considerable weight to the State Department's defini-
tion of a treaty trader in the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R).
However, the State Department regulations merely provide that to be
eligible for a treaty trader visa, an employee seeking entry must have
"duties of an executive or supervisory character," but they do not enu-
merate these duties.
10 2
Moreover, no cases interpret the definition of executive under the
INA. The sparse case law pertaining to executive eligibility for treaty
trader status, including administrative decisions of the Board of Immi-
97. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525 (1988). Another visa category that mentions executives is the
intra-company transfer category, which applies to individuals who wish to enter the United
States temporarily to do work in a managerial or executive capacity for a U.S. office of their
company. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(L) (1988); 22 C.F.R. § 41.54 (1990). These regulations
contain no further explanation of the term "executive."
98. MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d 1135, 1142 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 349 (1989). See also 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101 (West 1970) (listing FCN treaties to which
the treaty trader classification pertains).
99. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(E)(i) (1988). The statute provides that a visa may issue to an
alien if the purpose of the entry is "solely to carry on substantial trade, principally between the
United States and the foreign state of which he is a national." Id.
Treaty investors constitute another visa category. They are to be issued visas if the pur-
pose of entry is "solely to develop and direct the operations of an enterprise in which (they
have] invested, or of an enterprise of which [they are] actively in the process of investing, a
substantial amount of capital." 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(15)(E)(ii) (1988).
100. 8 U.S.C. § 1104 (1988).
101. Kun Young Kim v. Dist. Director of the United States Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service, 586 F.2d 713, 716 (9th Cir. 1978).
102. 22 C.F.R. § 41.51(c)(1990) states:
An alien employee of a treaty trader may be classified E-1 ... if the employee is or
will be engaged in duties of an executive or supervisory character, or, if employed in
a minor capacity, the employee has special qualifications that make the services to be
rendered essential to the efficient operation of the enterprise.
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gration Appeals, addresses only the other categories of treaty trader,
such as technical experts.1
0 3
Since the INA and its regulations and case law offer little guidance
for determining which jobs are executive within the Act, courts may con-
sider turning to internal State Department correspondence or practice. 4
When it issues treaty trader visas, State Department determinations as to
which positions are executive within the scope of FCN treaties are highly
subjective. In deciding whether to grant treaty trader visas, State De-
partment officials rely on several factors: the statute itself, the regulations
and decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals,"°5 and the qualifica-
tions of the applicant for the proposed position of employment °6
The State Department has issued instructions regarding treaty
trader visas which set forth more specific criteria. 0 7 According to these
instructions, the pertinent inquiry is whether the executive or supervisory
duties are a principal part of the position or merely incidental to it."" If
the job entails responsibility for a large part of the company's operation
103. See eg., Matter of Re Z- and R-, 8 I & N Dec. 482 (Assistant Comm'r 1959);
Matter of Konishi, 11 I & N Dec. 815 (Regional Comm'r 1966) (Executive Assistant was
denied treaty trader status because the Board of Immigration Appeals determined that mere
job title and language abilities do not constitute the "special qualifications" necessary to her
employer's operation as contemplated by the regulations). However, this "special qualifica-
tions" test is the C.F.R. standard for treaty traders "employed in a minor capacity" and there-
fore would not address the standard for executives.
104. See Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961) ("While courts interpret treaties for
themselves, the meaning given them by the departments of government particularly charged
with their negotiation and enforcement is given great weight.")
105. Letter from Lee Marks to Abner W. Sibal (Oct. 17, 1978), reprinted in Nash, supra
note 48, at 282-84. This letter describes the criteria used by the State Department to determine
which positions are within the scope of the treaty when it issues nonimmigrant visas to treaty
traders. The State Department "express[ed] no opinion on what positions would, in a particu-
lar case, qualify as executive personnel positions involving foreign nationals admitted to the
U.S. as treaty traders. Id, reprinted in Nash, supra note 48, at 282.
106. Ia, reprinted in Nash, supra note 48, at 283.
107. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, INSTRUCTIONS TO DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS RE-
GARDING TREATY TRADER VISAS, para. 5 (1981). This paragraph states in full:
Once all the necessary facts and evidence are before the consular officer in a specific
case, the test to be applied is essentially one of whether the executive/supervisory
component of the described position is an "incidental/collateral" function of the job
or a "principal/primary" function essentially inherent in the job's very nature. If the
position principally requires management skills, or entails supervision over and key
responsibility for a large portion of a firm's operation, and only incidentally involves
substantive, day-to-day staff work related to the firm's type of business, E-1 would be
appropriate in most circumstances. Conversely, if the position chiefly involves rou-
tine work that is the subject matter of the business and only secondarily entails super-
vision of several low-level employees, then the position in all probability could not be
termed "executive or supervisory" in character.
108. Id
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and principally requires management skills, then it is an executive posi-
tion, and an E-1 treaty trader visa should be issued."09 If the position
consists mainly of routine work and only incidentally involves supervi-
sion of low-level employees, then it is not an executive position."t 0 Fur-
ther, the position will only be considered executive if it is a top-level
management position."' 1 Some relevant factors in -this determination are
the degree of ultimate control and responsibility for a company's overall
operations inherent in the position, and whether the applicant has had
prior executive or supervisory experience. 
12
Though the INA was enacted to complement the FCN treaties,
there are several reasons to explore other U.S. statutes and international
criteria to determine whether these may be more helpful in defining exec-
utive. First, while the INA and its regulations and case law shed little
light on the definition of executive, other statutory, regulatory, or case
law definitions may offer greater specificity. Second, because the decision
to issue a treaty trader visa is based in part upon the qualifications of the
particular applicant,113 the decision itself may not be determinative of
whether the position is executive.114 Third, since the district court relied
on the definition of executive in another statute, the FLSA, other statutes
and international guidelines are presumably valid sources of
interpretation.
2. The Fair Labor Standards Act Definition'15
The FLSA, enacted in 1938, set minimum Wages, maximum work-
ing hours, and overtime pay requirements so that employees could enjoy
a "minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and gen-
eral well-being of workers."' 16 Certain types of jobs, including executive
positions, were deemed exempt from the wage and hour protections of
the FLSA, since their salary and working hours did not threaten the min-
imum standard of living.
The Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the Depart-
109. Id
110. Id
111. Id para. 6.
112. Id para. 4.
113. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
114. Thus, a determination that MacNamara's replacement, Mr. Chung, was a treaty
trader may not be determinative of whether McNamara was an executive, or whether the
position itself was an executive position.
115. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 2(a), 52 Stat. 1060 (current version at 29
U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988)).
116. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a) (1988).
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ment of Labor, by regulation, has defined the term "executive."'I 7 These
regulations have the force of law if they reasonably construe the language
and the clear intention of the FLSA. 115 The regulations set forth two
tests to determine which positions are executive. First, if the salary is
above 250 dollars per week, a two-part test is applied: (1) management of
the enterprise must be a primary duty, and (2) the individual must regu-
larly supervise the work of two or more employees.' 19 If the salary level
is between 155 dollars and 250 dollars per week, the above criteria, plus
the following, must be met: (1) the individual has the authority to hire
and fire, (2) the individual regularly exercises discretion, and (3) if the
individual is not in charge of an independent establishment (the "sole
charge exception"), he must spend less than twenty percent of his weekly
hours performing non-exempt work. 2 ' All of these administrative re-
quirements must be met for a job to constitute an executive position. 12
While neither high salary nor title'22 determines executive status, duties
are determinative."z Applicable sections of the C.F.R. represent the
clear intentions of the FLSA.124
These criteria are not directly applicable to FCN treaty partners,
because the FLSA is a domestic statute designed to focus on local con-
cerns of American companies. Other nations may have different ideas
about how their companies should handle minimum standards of pay,
primary duties, and supervisory responsibilities.
Most cases which interpret the specific factors in these tests have
focused on defining "discretion." The courts have determined that exec-
utive exercise of discretion must entail decisions regarding policy, not
merely the mechanics of performance.' 25 It involves more than the ordi-
nary discretion which any skilled worker exercises in day-to-day activi-
ties.'26 Further, an individual is deemed to have exercised discretion
even if his decisions have been prescribed by prior instruction, such as a
policy manual, 27 or are subject to approval by a higher level of
117. 29 C.F.R. § 541.1 (1989).
118. Stanger v. Glenn L. Martin Co., 56 F. Supp. 163, 165 (D. Md. 1944). See also Wall-
ig v. General Industries Co., 330 U.S. 545, 547 (1947).
119. 29 C.F.R. § 541.1 (1988).
120. Ia
121. Rothman v. Publicker Industries, Inc., 201 F.2d 618, 619 (3d Cir. 1953).
122. Stanger, 56 F. Supp. at 166.
123. Id at 164.
124. 29 C.F.R. § 541.1 (1988).
125. Rothman, 201 F.2d at 620.
126. Schanck v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 52 N.Y.S.2d 491, 492 (City Ct. 1941).
127. Donovan v. Burger King Corp., 672 F.2d 221, 223, 226 (Ist Cir. 1982).
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management. 128
Courts have determined that many jobs considered to be rather low-
level managerial positions fit within the FLSA definition of executive.
For example, Burger King assistant managers who make more than 250
dollars per week, 129 restaurant managers of a waffle house, 130 section
foremen in mines, 3 ' and bowling alley managers132 have all been found
to be executives.
3. Age Discrimination in the Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA)
Definition
When Congress amended the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act 33 (ADEA) to raise the upper age limit for mandatory retirement
from sixty-five to seventy, it retained sixty-five as the mandatory retire-
ment age for executives.1 34 Congress carved out this exception to permit
employers to replace certain key employees and to keep promotional
channels open for younger employees.' 35 The House report made it clear
that the intent was to include only "bona fide executives" within this
exception.'
36
Because the intent of Congress was to define executive more nar-
rowly in the ADEA than in the FLSA,137 it included all of the criteria
from the FLSA definition and added examples to illustrate the positions
that would qualify as executive under the ADEA. 138 The FLSA defini-
tion and these examples are embodied in the C.F.R..139 The examples of
a "bona fide executive" include the following: the head of a significant
and substantial local or regional operation but not of a minor branch;
heads of major corporate divisions or departments, such as finance, mar-
keting, legal, and productline basis; and immediate subordinates of heads
128. Dymond v. U.S. Postal Service, 670 F.2d 93, 96 (8th Cir. 1982).
129. Donovan, 672 F.2d at 221.
130. Donovan v. Waffle House, 99 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 34,457 (1983).
131. Guthrie v. Lady Jane Collieries, Inc., 99 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 1 34,482 (1983), aff'd, 722
F.2d 1141 (3d Cir. 1983).
132. Marshall v. Hendersonville Bowling Center, Inc., 91 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 1 34,023
(1980).
133. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988).
134. Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256,
§ 12, 92 Stat. 189 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 631(c) (1988)).
. 135. S. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONo. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 504, 510.
136. H.R. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONO. &
ADMIN. NEWS 504, 530-31.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.12(d)(1) (1990).
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of these divisions if the organization is large.' 40
The courts, in keeping with congressional intent, have interpreted
the meaning of executive within the ADEA very narrowly. One court
held that a high level of compensation and perquisites were not determi-
native of executive status; however, they are factors to consider. 14' The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals gave a particularly narrow meaning to
executive in Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp.'42 The Whittlesey court
held that the high salaried chief labor counsel of a large corporation was
not an executive. '43 The court found that he had few administrative or
executive responsibilities because his primary duty was to perform legal
work, that his supervisory duties were minimal, and that he played a
minor role in policymaking.'"
"Bona fide executives" within the ADEA definition, therefore, in-
clude only a few top-level employees who exercise substantial executive
authority over a significant number of employees and a large volume of
business. Thus, middle managers are not executives within the meaning
of the ADEA.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) adminis-
ters the ADEA. The EEOC's interpretation of the ADEA exemptions is
reflected in its interpretive regulations in the C.F.R.' 45 These regulations
define the term "bona fide executive" and provide guidance on how to
determine whether an employee qualifies as such. The EEOC notes that
its policy guidelines regarding the meaning of executive should be used in
conjunction with the U.S. Department of Labor's interpretive regula-
tions.'" These regulations define the executive for Labor Department
purposes as not applying to an employee who "is in sole charge of a phys-
ically separated branch establishment."' 147 The regulation also seeks to
define executive on the basis of a position's primary duties, authorities,
responsibilities, discretionary powers, and the percentage of work de-
voted to specific tasks.
148
Applying the Department of Labor's interpretive regulations, in
conjunction with those of the EEOC, to the facts of Korean Air Lines,
MacNamara might not qualify as an executive for at least two reasons.
140. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.12(d)(2).
141. Colby v. Graniteville Co., 635 F. Supp. 381, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
142. 742 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1984).
143. Id at 725.
144. Id at 726-27.
145. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1625.12, 1627.17 (1990).
146. 29 C.F.R. § 541.1(a)-(e) (1989).
147. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.1(e) (1989).
148. 29 C.F.R. § 541.1 (1988).
1990]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
First, as discussed above, the scope of his duties was limited. Second,
MacNamara was employed only in a branch office of the KAL establish-
ment in the United States. Both circumstances weigh against
MacNamara's position being considered executive under the ADEA
guidelines.
4. Bankruptcy Act Definition of Executive
Bankruptcy law149 limits liability for false financial statements to
those who are more likely to be aware of the severe consequences that
may follow.1 " The case law on this statutory provision is scarce, but
courts have held that a person deemed an executive under the Bank-
ruptcy Act must hold a position with policymaking authority,151 and
that the fact that an employee is a corporate officer, director, or stock-
holder is not determinative.
15 2
5. International Labor Organization Definition of Executive
In addition to U.S. domestic authorities, the Korean Air Lines courts
could have turned to the International Labor Organization (ILO)1 3 for
guidance on a suitable definition of executive status personnel. The Ge-
neva-based ILO, the oldest of all the specialized UN agencies, 154 provides
wide-ranging assistance to the international community on labor-related
matters. 155 The characterization of high-level management positions de-
veloped by the ILO could be used to complement U.S. domestic sources
in defining executive in a way which comports with the common world-
wide understanding of that term.
156
The ILO, in conjunction with many governments and other interna-
tional organizations, 157 developed the "International Standard Classifica-
149. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4) (1988).
150. S. REP. No. 1688, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1960 U.S. CODE CONO. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2954, 2955.
151. In Re Dunn, 422 F.2d 501, 503 (2d Cir. 1970).
152. In Re Butler, 425 F.2d 47, 52 (3d Cir. 1970).
153. The International Labor Organization (ILO) was created in 1919 as part of the
League of Nations. The international agency offers an international mechanism for improving
labor standards and for collecting and disseminating information on labor and industrial rela.
tions. The ILO's basic objectives were broadened in 1944 when the ILO adopted the "Decla-
ration of Philadelphia." Soon after this major development, the ILO became a specialized
agency of the United Nations. See generally A. ALCOCK, HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL
LABOR ORGANIZATION (1971).
154. Id
155. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL STANDARD CLASSIFICATION OF





tion of Occupations" (ISCO).' 5s The ISCO index compares information
relating to the function, duties, and tasks of relevant jobs from countries
worldwide into a common classification system. 159
The ISCO offers a useful characterization of executive status person-
nel. The ISCO is a useful reference "and a basic tool organizing occupa-
tional information for international purposes .... ."I' It systematically
evaluates and rates occupations, and in doing so, captures the essence of
each job function, giving true meaning to the term "executive": it offers
a comparison of jobs and elaborates on the substance of the duties per-
formed by executive status personnel. 6
The ISCO's definition for each worker occupation is broken into
several minor and major groupings which classify a number of occupa-
tions into "professional," "technical," or other categories, and defines the
functions, duties, and tasks of such positions.1
62
Managerial personnel are described as people who serve as "direc-
tors and managers, [who] plan, organise, co-ordinate and direct the activ-
ities of private or public enterprises, or organizations, or one or more of
their departments .... ,63 The ISCO offers several subcategories under
the term "manager."'6 These subgroupings include individuals per-
forming management functions.' 65 Some members of these subgroupings
may have "special titles, including such terms as 'chief,' 'director' or
158. Id. The ISCO was "developed to provide a systematic basis for presentation of occu-
pation data relating to different countries in order to facilitate international comparisons... to
provide an international standard classification system which countries may use in developing
their national occupational classifications... with the aim of achieving convertibility to the
international system." Id The United States, and at least thirteen countries, submitted com-
ments adopting the "International Conference of Labor Statisticians, which [met] under the
auspices of the International Labor Organization in 1954." Id The United States officially
participated in and endorsed the ILO classification of the Ninth International Conference on
labor statistics. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OrpICE, GENERAL REPORT ON LABOUR STATIS-
Ics 52 (1957) (report prepared for the Ninth International Conference of Labor Statisticians).
159. ISCO, supra note 155, at 2.
160. Id at M.
161. Id
162. Id at 35-93.
163. Id at 93. Both the "manager" and "government executive" perform similar func-
tions, duties, and tasks, and their respective job classifications merit executive status. How-
ever, this may not be the case in other instances as not all professional or technical staff
positions "coupled with some limited responsibility for supervision" under the title "manager"
merit executive status. Id at 11.
Nonetheless, the ISCO classification of the two equivalent titles, manager and government
executive, fall within the type of functions, duties, and tasks generally thought of as those
performed by an executive.
164. Id at 95-97.
165. Id
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'manager,' but.., do not principally carry out duties within the scope of
the functions of management." '66 Such individuals "principally perform
professional or technical functions," 6 ' but are not considered manag-
ers. 68 Presumably, these are not persons who possess executive author-
ity and responsibilities or perform executive-type tasks. Rather, such
employees have special titles, but do not hold positions which entitle
them (or their replacements) to receive executive status.
The index of occupations can provide both U.S. courts and the U.S.
Department of State with a yardstick to measure and evaluate each of the
various functions, duties, and tasks of a particular worker. 169 The classi-
fication system could be used to substantiate treaty trader status for cer-
tain employees who claim executive status. Although the ISCO does not
specifically mention FCN treaties or define executive, it does provide a
generic definition for the term that might generally be useful in disputes
involving FCN treaties.
The ISCO is not definitive of the term "executive" as it is used in the
private sector, but it does give a working definition of the term "man-
ager" as a useful reference point, and elaborates on the meaning of execu-
tive in the public sector for government personnel. 170 This
characterization of government executive personnel is useful to the dis-
cussion of executive status personnel in the private sector. For example,
under the ISCO, a sales manager 171 is an individual who holds a job
position which requires him to "plan[ ], organise[ ] and control[ ] sales
activities of an industrial undertaking or other organisation." Such a
person is classified as managerial personnel, 172 and is presumably an ex-
166. Id. at 95.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 2. See also id. at 9-12 for a discussion of definitions and titles.
170. See supra note 156.
171. ISCO, supra note 155, at 96.
172. Id. A "general manager' "plan[s], direct[s], control[s] and co-ordinate[s] on propric.
tor's or on own behalf, the activities of an ... enterprise ... ." Id. at 95. General managers
coordinate the work of departmental managers or other immediate subordinates. Id. A "gov-
ernment administrator" official appears to perform functions anadogous to those of a "general
manager" in the private sector, who appears to operate as an executive of a corporation. See
id at 94.
A general manager is specifically excluded from the definition of certain types of establish-
ments. Id at 95. This category may be more akin to the "government administrator" who,
like the general manager, "plan[s], organise[s] and direct[s] activities of government depart.
ments and agencies to implement government policy and laws, rules and regulations" or some
other enterprise. Id. at 94.
Persons classified as government executives "put into effect government policy decisions
and implement laws, rules and regulations under the direction of government administrators."
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ecutive. Plaintiff MacNamara's job title was district sales manager, but
his duties did not include those listed in the ISCO definition. Thus,
MacNamara was not managerial personnel under the ISCO.
Much consideration should be given to the ILO's systematic occu-
pational classifications. Application of the ILO's methodical analysis to
FCN treaty disputes may reduce potential conflict of jurisdictions or
avoid other foreign policy tensions between nations.
D. The Meaning of Engage in the FCN Treaty
In Korean Air Lines, MacNamara argued that the use of the term
"engage" in the treaty' gives foreign companies only the right to hire
executives of their choice, not to fire them. His argument relied on dic-
tionary definitions of engage, 74 and on the fact that there exists no indi-
cation that the drafters of the FCN treaty intended the term "engage" to
also mean terminate.'75 He also relied on "common sense."'
176
KAL took a more policy-oriented approach toward defining en-
gage, 17 7 reasoning that including the right to terminate in the right to
hire made sense for four reasons. First, the interpretation is more in
keeping with the treaty's assurance that foreign companies may manage
and control their investments.' 71 Second, it comports with the Korean
government's interpretation. 179 Third, it makes more economic sense to
allow companies to reorganize and eliminate positions, which would not
be possible if the companies were prohibited from firing the employees
holding certain positions. 8' Finally, it coincides with the plain meaning
of the term.' 8 '
The district court opinion adopted the Korean Ministry of Foreign
Affairs's broad interpretation of the "of their choice" language. Under
the ministry's broad interpretation, foreign employers are given free dis-
Id at 100. An executive serving in this capacity may perform executive secretarial duties for
departmental heads on behalf of governmental administrators. Id The governmental execu-
tive official classification does not encompass "employees whose principle functions are to
carry out professional, technical and related duties." Id
173. See supra text accompanying note 14 for treaty language.
174. See MacNamara's Cross-Petition, supra note 43, at 10-11.
175. Id at 10.
176. Appellant's Brief, supra note 52, at 32.
177. KAL also relied on the definition in Black's Dictionary. Appellee's Brief, supra note
52, at 47. Plaintiff questioned the use of this authority since the accompanying example given
in Black's did not involve employment. Appellant's Brief, supra note 52, at 32-33.
178. Appellee's Brief, supra note 52, at 46.
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cretion in hiring decisions, so "the term engagement naturally includes
termination." ' 2
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals queried whether article VIII(l)
allowed KAL to fire MacNamara for the very reason of reassigning his
job to an executive of their choice. 8 3 It concluded that such a replace-
ment was within the definition of engage. 184 The court stated that a
"contrary reading of [a]rticle VIII(l) would tend -to freeze a foreign busi-
ness' initial management structure and discourage any experimentation
with host country executive personnel," and that it was certain this was
not the intent of the treaty drafters. 85 This statement suggests that the
court would allow a termination under the treaty for reasons other than
the fact that there was a replacement for the terminated employee. For
example, a restructuring of the company or a mere desire to fire an exec-
utive who is a native of the host country constitutes a sufficient reason to
terminate an employee.
HI. APPLICATION OF THE DEFINITION OF
EXECUTIVE AND ENGAGE TO MkcNAMARA'S
POSITION AT KOREAN AIR LINES
A. Critique of the Various Definitions of Executive
In analyzing whether MacNamara was an executive according to
the FCN treaty, it is critical to note that the purpose of the treaty's provi-
sion allowing foreign companies to engage executives of their choice is to
allow foreign companies doing business in the United States to manage
and control their investments.18 6 Thus, the issue of whether, or to what
extent, a foreign-owned company can engage executive personnel of their
choice is of such importance that courts have a duty to set a clear stan-
182. MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 45 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 384, 389 (E.D. Pa,
1987).
183. MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d 1135, 1141 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 349 (1989).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text. In assessing the meaning of the terms of
this treaty, certain rules of treaty interpretation must be kept in mind. Treaties are part of the
domestic law of the United States (Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924)) and
are the supreme law of the land. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. A court's role in interpreting a
treaty is limited to giving effect to the intent of the treaty parties. Sumitomo, Shoji America,
Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 185 (1982). Inconsistent federal legislation governs only when
Congress clearly intends to depart from the obligations of the treaty. McCulloch v. Sociedad
Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21-22 (1963). Moreover, the meaning given
to treaties by departments of government charged with their negotiation and enforcement is
given great weight. Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961).
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dard for the interpretation of what constitutes an executive under a FCN
treaty.
1. Immigration and Naturalization Act
As noted, the INA definition of executive closely approximates the
FCN treaty's definition, as the Act was meant to complement such trea-
ties.187 While there is no specific definition of executive in the INA itself,
there are indications in the accompanying C.F.R. regulations that the
position must entail duties of an executive or supervisory character.188
The most specific guidelines are set forth in State Department Instruc-
tions for granting treaty trader visas." 9
MacNamara's position does not fit within the State Department's
definition of executive. His job entailed responsibility for only a three-
state sales office of an international company; this does not represent a
large part of KAL's operations. His position required supervision of
low-level employees, which indicates only incidental involvement in ex-
ecutive duties. Although MacNamara did have some degree of discre-
tion and responsibility, his discretion was limited in many ways.1 90
MacNamara is better characterized as a middle manager rather than a
top manager because he lacked ultimate control over the company's op-
erations. Further, top level management of a large company such as
KAL would be expected to command a salary of more than the 23,000
dollars per year earned by MacNamara. For these reasons, it is not feasi-
ble to characterize MacNamara as holding a management or executive
position as defined by the INA.
2. Fair Labor Standards Act
There is little doubt that MacNamara would be defined as an execu-
tive under the FLSA definition of that term. He earned more that 250
dollars per week, his primary duty was to manage an enterprise (the re-
gional sales office), and he regularly directed the activities of two or more
people. If positions such as assistant manager of a fast food restaurant
and park service manager are executives under the FLSA, MacNamara's
position would clearly be executive as well.
However, the purpose of the FLSA is quite different from the pur-
pose of a FCN treaty. The FLSA purports only to guarantee a minimum
187. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 105-110 and accompanying text.
190. For example, his decisions regarding employee hiring and promotion were subject to
approval from higher level managers.
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standard of living.19 It excludes executives from the wage and hour re-
quirements as they presumably do not need this statutory protection.
1 92
Nonetheless, classifying executives as those needing no protection from
unduly low compensation is a much different matter than deciding which
executives manage and control a business. Thus, FLSA's definition of
executive is broader than that contemplated by the latter. Although
MacNamara would be considered an executive under the FLSA, this def-
inition is not the proper standard to use in disputes arising under FCN
treaties.
3. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act
Under the ADEA, KAL would find little support for its claim of
MacNamara's executive status. The Act defines executive very narrowly,
including only a few top-level employees who exercise substantial author-
ity over a significant number of employees and a large volume of busi-
ness; middle managers are not executives under this statute. 193
Since MacNamara's duties and level of responsibility resembled
those of a middle manager, he would probably not be considered an exec-
utive under the ADEA. His managerial duties, such as supervising ad-
ministrative personnel, overseeing sales for a three state territory, and
developing marketing plans, do require some degree of responsibility and
discretion. However, they do not entail substantial executive authority
over a significant number of employees and a large volume of business.
The executive provision in the FCN treaty coincides with the execu-
tive exception in ADEA more closely than with the exception in the
FLSA. However, the ADEA definition of executive may be a bit narrow
for the purposes of the FCN treaty since there are managerial employees
beneath the highest level in a business who still contribute significantly to
the management and control of the enterprise.
4. Bankruptcy Act
As noted, the Bankruptcy Act has limited value in the search for an
appropriate definition of executive. The sparse case law has interpreted
an executive under the Act to be one with policymaking authority.
1 94
This is in keeping with the Act's purpose of limiting liability for false
financial statements to those who are likely to be aware of the severe
191. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
192. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 137-140 and accompanying text.
194. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
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consequences. 195 Therefore, the definition of executive under this Act
involves a qualitative rather than a quantitative inquiry. Under this stat-
ute, the type of an employee's responsibility is examined to determine
whether it involves policymaking. This is different from the INA, the
FLSA, and ADEA definitions of executive, which largely involve an in-
quiry into how much responsibility an employee has, as well as the type of
responsibility. Although MacNamara had some supervisory and discre-
tionary authority, he had very little policy-making authority and, there-
fore, would probably not be an executive within the meaning of the
Bankruptcy Act.
The purpose of the Bankruptcy Act executive provision does not
closely coincide with the purpose of the FCN treaties. For this reason,
this Act's definition of executive would not be helpful in interpreting the
term in the FCN treaties. Although policy-making is an important part
of managing and controlling an enterprise, it is only one part. There are
other aspects of management and control, such as responsibility for prof-
its and losses, budgeting, long-term planning, and other duties.
In sum, of all the domestic statutes defining executive, that which
most closely approximates the purpose of the FCN treaty is the INA,
since it was enacted to complement the treaties. 196 Thus, the best source
for a definition is the State Department Instructions."' This definition
could be supplemented by the definition in the ADEA, since its purpose
and interpretation approximates that of the treaty. The FLSA and Bank-
ruptcy Acts, however, were enacted for different purposes, and their defi-
nitions do not comply with that contemplated for the treaty. Thus, they
should not be relied on.
B. International Labor Organization's International Standard
Classification of Occupations
Measured against the ISCO's characterization of specific occupa-
tions, it is doubtful that MacNamara performed the "manager's" duties,
functions, and tasks equivalent to those of executive personnel. Both the
district and Third Circuit courts concluded that his position and respon-
sibilities, as well as those of his replacement, constituted executive status.
However, finding that MacNamara was a manager with executive per-
sonnel status is far too generous a construction of the realities of his job.
Both of the court opinions develop and rely on an incomplete and
195. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
196. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 105-110 and accompanying text.
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flawed picture of MacNamara's job and the meaning of executive. While
the district court settles principally on the FLSA to assess MacNamara's
status, the Third Circuit turns to the treaty trader status of his replace-
ment as evidence of executive status under the F(N treaty. These falli-
ble approaches to understanding the meaning of executive, coupled with
the Third Circuit court's unwillingness to confront this issue on appeal
resulted in an improper finding that MacNamara was an executive.
The courts' approaches further complicate the meaning of the term
and fall short of offering concrete guidance to other courts. Courts re-
quire a workable definition of executive in order to adjudicate labor dis-
putes under FCN treaties. The Korean Air Lines courts should have
focused on MacNamara's responsibilities as well as his replacement's du-
ties, functions, and tasks under the ISCO to arrive at a definition of exec-
utive personnel. Without a clear meaning of this term, labor litigation
will persist when the parties attempt to determine whether a foreign com-
pany has the freedom to select an executive of its choice.
The district court found that an employee seeking entry into the
United States must have "duties of an executive or supervisory charac-
ter," but the court did not enumerate these duties. 198 The court of ap-
peals held that "the relevant inquiry is whether MacNamara's
responsibilities were reassigned to an 'executive' within the meaning of
[article VIII(l)]." 199 The court of appeals also found "that the govern-
ment's decision granting entry to Chung as an E-1 treaty trader is strong
evidence of his executive personnel status." 2"
No doubt both MacNamara and his replacement performed some of
the supervisory duties of executive personnel. However, viewed through
the lens of the ILO's standards on high level management personnel,
neither MacNamara nor Chung possessed the broad range of responsibil-
ities necessary to characterize them as executive personnel. Thus, a criti-
cal evaluation of the facts under the ILO standards raises a pertinent
question about the court's outright acceptance of MacNamara's status as
an executive. In short, there is serious doubt that MacNamara (or even
his replacement) ever served as an "executive" under the terms of the
FCN treaty or the ISCO.20 1
198. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
199. MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d 1135, 1141 (3rd Cir. 1988).
200. Id. at 1142.
201. See id. at 1141-2. In his cross-petition for certiorari, MacNamara recounts his conten-
tion that his job did not pose executive responsibilities. He says that his duties as district sales
manager were "purely administrative." MacNamara's Cross-Petition, supra note 43, at 12.
Any "serious decisions involving such things as hiring and firing of personnel, could only be
made with approval of KAL's offices in New York, Los Angeles, or Seoul, Korea." Id.
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1. ISCO's Definition of Sales Manager
The ISCO notes that a "sales manager" is one who:
Plans, organises and controls sales activities of an industrial undertak-
ing or other organisation, except a wholesale or retail business, and
participates in formulating sales policy: assesses market potential and
evaluates sales record [sic]; consults general manager and departmen-
tal managers to determine price schedules, discount and delivery
terms, staff and sales promotion budget; plans and organises sales
programmes including sales methods, incentives, special campaigns
and staff training; controls and co-ordinates the activities of the sales
department... and .... [m]ay personally negotiate large sales con-
tracts. May plan, organise and control market research related to sales
activities. May negotiate with advertising and similar agencies on the
preparation and presentation of the organisation's sales publicity and
approve material before publication.
202
Although MacNamara performed some of the duties of a "sales
manager"2 3 (eg., handled some personnel matters, was involved to some
extent in sales activities and setting of some sales strategies, and had lim-
ited authority), he did not perform sales activities of an industrial under-
taking. Though MacNamara held the title "district sales manager," the
ISCO would not automatically elevate his overall job functions, duties,
tasks, and responsibilities to the level of executive status. The ISCO of-
fers several descriptions of managerial status,201 and cautions that some
members of this subcategory may not be considered managers if they
have "special titles, including such titles as 'chief,' 'director' or 'man-
ager,' but ... do not principally carry out duties within the scope of the
function of management." 0" Such individuals "principally perform pro-
fessional or technical functions," but are not considered "managers.""' z 6
MacNamara then contends that the district court and the Third Circuit found that his job was
entitled to executive status as well as his replacement, and that these "conclusions reached by
the [courts] as to the status of MacNamara's successor were inappropriate." M,
202. ISCO, supra note 155, at 96 (emphasis added).
203. MacNamara participated in formulating sales policy for the district, but not the entire
organization. Korean Air Lines, 45 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 388. He evaluated some
sales activities and hired and fired a staff of six. See ISCO, supra note 155, at 96. However,
according to the ISCO, he functioned as a "sales supervisor" who "supervise[d] workers en-
gaged in selling activities." Id at 116. He estimated the needs of customers and his staff. He
also supervised and instructed the sales staff in their daily activities. MacNamara also made
"recommendations concerning sales promotion and price policies." Id. at 117 (definition of
sales supervisor (retail trade)).
204. ISCO, supra note 155, at 95-97.
205. Id at 95.
206. Id
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MacNamara typifies a person who does not perform executive status
functions, but who has a special title and appears to perform a few of the
tasks reserved for executive personnel. He was a district sales manager
of a KAL branch office operating in the United States. He was in reality
functioning as a professional sales supervisor 2°7 whose functions are not
considered those of a manager.20 8
2. ISCO's Definition of Sales Supervisor
The ISCO characterizes a sales supervisor 2°9 as someone who:
Supervises workers in a retail trade establishment engaged in buying
goods for resale and selling them for personal or household consump-
tion or other use: under the general direction of the proprietor or man-
ager, estimates the needs of customers and orders goods of the types,
qualities and quantities required; supervises and instructs sales staff in
their day-to-day work in accordance with the sales policies of the under-
taking; ensures that goods are attractively and effectively displayed and
that security, accounting and stock control rules and procedures are
observed.
May engage staff and initiate other personnel action such as pro-
motion, transfer, discharge and disciplinary measures. May make rec-
ommendations concerning sales promotion and pricing policies. 10
Other sales supervisors not included in the above description may
perform supervisory duties and perform a combination of tasks such as:
supervis[ing] canvassing, display, or demonstration activities; in-
spect[ing] sales activities in various branches or departments of a retail
or wholesale establishment; supervis[ing] sales workers employed in
the sales department of a manufacturing enterprine; inspect[ing] the
activities and results of distribution agencies within a specified territo-
rial division engaged in selling the products of an industrial, import or
other undertaking; [and] give expert advice on sales promotion
methods.211
A sales supervisor "instructs sales staff in their day-to-day work in
accordance with the sales policies.12 12 Such an employee does not "prin-
cipally carry out duties within the scope of the functions of manage-
207. See id. at 116.
208. Id at 95.
209. Id. at 117.
210. Id. (emphasis added).
211. Id. at 117 (emphasis added). This description of other sales supervisors matches or




ment," '213 but actually performs as a professional or technical person.21 4
Not only was MacNamara a district sales manager of a branch office
in America, but he received a salary of only 23,000 dollars per year. His
duties included supervising the airline marketing activities in Penn-
sylvania, Delaware, and southern New Jersey. The district court noted
that MacNamara reported to the Vice President of Marketing for North
America in New York, supervised six personnel, hired and fired staff,
and was involved in cargo and passenger sales.215 He also implemented
strategic marketing changes without headquarter's authorization.216 The
court combined MacNamara's job title and limited functions to elevate
him to executive status when his functions, duties, and responsibilities
resembled those of a sales supervisor.21 7
In short, MacNamara and his replacement are better described
under the ISCO as sales supervisors, who handle some routine personnel
matters and the day-to-day sales work of the branch office, but not as
sales managers.
The responsibilities of a sales manager more closely resemble the job
of an executive than do those of sales supervisors. MacNamara appears
to have been one of several workers who handled district sales for the
U.S. branch offices in just a few states. He was not the chief person re-
sponsible for all of KAL's sales within the United States. The ISCO
defines a sales manager as one who "[p]lans, organizes and controls sales
activities of an industrial undertaking or other organization . ,,.218
Although MacNamara performed some of the duties of a manager,1 9 his
enriched title did not necessarily qualify him to be classified as a man-
ager, and thus an executive under the ISCO.
IV. FCN TREATIES AND THE DEFINITIONS
OF ENGAGE
The FCN treaties offer no definition of the term "engage," nor do
any U.S. statutes or cases. MacNamara's cited dictionary definitions
only address the term narrowly, and do not consider the various situa-
213. Id at 95. For a definition of sales manager, see id at 96.
214. Id at 11, 95.
215. MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 45 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 384, 388 (F-D. Pa.
1987).
216. Id at 387-88.
217. ISCO, supra note 155, at 117.
218. Id at 96.
219. For a discussion of "manager", see id at 11, 95. For a definition of sales manager, see
id at 96.
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tions which could occur involving an interpretation of the term. Since
the interpretation of engage in the FCN treaty has never been assessed, it
is helpful to consider it from a policy oriented approach, as did KAL and
the court of appeals.
These policy reasons turned on KAL's and the court's concern with
preserving a company's ability to fire at will, and the negative economic
and business consequences that would accompany an inability to do so.
KAL argued that the treaty's purpose of allowing foreign companies to
manage and control an investment would be thwarted if a company were
not allowed to terminate employees as it chose. It also argued that it
makes more economic sense to allow companies to restructure, which
entails eliminating some positions and, consequently, some employees.
The Third Circuit was also concerned with preserving a company's abil-
ity to restructure and experiment with different employees without fear
that it would be prohibited from firing any of these employees if the ex-
perimentation failed.
A company's ability to make business decisions with regard to re-
structuring, hiring, and firing of employees has not been interfered with
absent an express legislative or judicial mandate,220 and there seems to be
no reason to include a foreign company's decisions among the rare excep-
tions to the employment at will doctrine.
If treaties prohibited foreign companies from terminating employ-
ees, the result may be similar to other situations in which employers are
restricted in their ability to fire. For example, the advent of the FLSA
and the evolution of the employment at will doctrine, while unquestiona-
bly answering a great need in the United States and engendering many
positive effects, have also led to certain detrimental employment prac-
tices. Employers and employees alike have been known to take advan-
tage of the law and make use of it in ways not intended. Employers
might use the law to limit or deny terms and conditions of employment
to employees. On the other hand, some employees whose work perform-
ance might not be satisfactory can hide behind similar laws, threatening
an employer with the use of various shortcomings in the workplace as a
form of blackmail to compel the employer to refrain from taking discipli-
nary action. The employer may respond accordingly because the em-
ployee is in a position to sue the company if fired.
The public policies in favor of allowing companies to make their
own employment decisions, and the negative consequences that can oc-
220. See, eg., 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (West 1981) and judicial decisions limiting the "em-
ployment at will" doctrine.
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cur where this is curtailed, support an interpretation of the definition of
engage which includes the power to terminate.
V. CONCLUSION
In sum, the growth of foreign-owned corporations operating in the
United States under Friendship, Commerce and Navigation treaties
presents U.S. policymakers and the judiciary with a unique opportunity
to clarify the meaning of specific FCN provisions as applied to the
workforce of these companies. Prior court decisions have failed to set a
clear standard as to who are executive personnel under FCN treaties.
The interpretation and application of these treaties has a direct effect on
commercial deals between the United States and its trading partners.
The term "executive" has a variety of meanings depending on the
reference used to evaluate it. For example, the Immigration and Natu-
ralization Act and International Standard Classification of Occupations
best provide guidance on the meaning of the term, while the Fair Labor
Standards Act, Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and Bank-
ruptcy Act are only marginally useful in the search for an appropriate
definition of executive in the FCN treaty context.
Of the several U.S. statutes and international sources, the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Act is most helpful because of its interpretive
regulations. The International Standards Classification of Occupations
complements the search for an appropriate definition of executive be-
cause it lends itself to a creative evaluation of that term. The ISCO also
allows for a more realistic and uniform evaluation of the term and cap-
tures the essence of the functions performed by executive personnel, giv-
ing a standard meaning to the term across international borders.
The definition of engage within the context of FCN treaties is best
characterized by the plain meaning of the word. If a FCN treaty entitles
a treaty partner to the option of engaging persons of their choice for
certain types of positions, quite naturally that treaty provision should
also encompass the right of the company to disengage persons of their
choice. Government and judicial officers must bear in mind that the
plain meaning approach must also approximate the economic realities of
the particular treaty. This approach to the term "engage" will most ef-
fectively assist the parties involved in understanding the interests of the
signatories when called upon to apply the terms of a treaty to the opera-
tion of a commercial enterprise. Further, those involved in this process
must always be mindful of the essential purpose of a FCN treaty. These
bilateral agreements are intended to allow the treaty partners the corn-
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mercial freedom to control their assets and corporate structure, and
make personnel decisions affecting the company abroad without undue
influence from the host country. A liberal interpretation and application
of the term "engage" furthers that end.
